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The concept of modularity has gained recently a growing attention in
the management literature as a key to explain the contemporary trends
of industrial dynamics. A stronger exploitation of external «network-
based»   economies   with   respect   to   internal   «bureaucracy-based»
economies is one of the major consequences of the diffusion of flexible
production systems and of modular architectures for products. To
explain this connection, in this paper a model is presented which tries
to explain the co-evolution of technology and organization as the
outcome of a complex evolutionary process. In particular, through a set
of exploratory agent-based simulations we try to show the existence of
qualitatively different dynamic processes in coincidence of different
phases and specific conditions of product and technology development,
as well as the existence of a relationship between this dynamics and
other   competitive   factors,  determining   a   wide  set   of  structurally
different dynamical patterns in coincidence of different combinations of
factors. 
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11. Modularity and modular networks
Recently the concept of modularity has gained a growing attention in the management literature as a
key to explain a set of emerging trends that are progressively  and profoundly modifying the
industrial landscape of developed countries  [Baldwin and Clark 1997, 2000; Schilling 2000;
Fleming and Sorenson 2001a, 2001b and 2003; Galunic and Eisenhardt 2001; Schilling and
Steesma, 2001; Langlois 2002a; Sturgeon 2002]. In the last two decades firms have redefined their
boundaries and relations with markets (through an extensive resort to  outsourcing), internal
functioning processes (with a growing flexibilisation of the labor force), as well as the geographical
scale of their operations (through delocalisation and foreign direct investments). This passage took
place under the double pressure of technological change and of final demand: the former has given
to firms the opportunity to reduce the costs of information exchange and elaboration thanks to the
cluster of innovations linked to the «Information Revolution» [Freeman e Louçã 2001; Mokir 2002;
Perez 2002]; the latter has progressively differentiated and become more difficult to predict, asking
for more flexibility in production processes and for more speed in product innovation [Langlois e
Robertson 1992], thus favoring the birth and development of new systems oriented towards
«flexible production» [Milgrom and Roberts 1990; 1995]. 
Business-oriented studies generally agree that the major benefits of flexible production systems are
realized when the latter combine with a modular design of products, that fosters a higher speed of
innovation and an easier differentiation of product themselves. Following Ulrich [1995], we can
define an architecture of a product as the combination of three design specifications: i) the pattern of
functional components; ii) the mapping between functional and physical components; iii) the
definition of the interfaces between linked physical components
1. An architecture can be defined as
modular when there is a one-to-one mapping between functional and physical components, and
interfaces are de-coupled. The latter condition means that an interface is designed in such a way as
to minimize the need to change a physical component as a consequence of a change in another
component linked to the first one through that interface. When one of the two conditions is not
fulfilled, the architecture is said to be «integral». The main advantage of modularity consists in a
greater easiness to change product functionality, because each functional element can be varied
simply changing the corresponding physical component without any further change on other
components. An architecture of this kind makes easier for firms to increase product variety, because
each change in function needs only one physical component to be updated, and variety can be
1 Ulrich's definition draws on previous studies, which had focused on the relationships between innovation dynamics and
product architecture, as for example that of Abernathy e Utterback [1975] and more recently those of  Henderson and
Clark [1990], and Henderson [1992]. Subsequently the notion of modularity in design has been reconsidered and further
developed by Baldwin e Clark [2000]. 
2achieved in a combinatorial way without the risk of a complexity explosion due to uncontrolled
interdependencies. 
As long as product variety is the main goal of flexible production systems, a modular architecture is
thus   particularly  fit   for   them.   At  the  same  time   a  modular   architecture  helps   components'
standardization, because if each component performs only one function there is a higher probability
that this function is shared by different products or different versions of the same product. Further,
there is a likely relationship between product architectures and organizational models which, when a
modular architecture with standardized components is available, should favor the possibility to
outsource  the production of those components. This relationship seems to be confirmed by the fact
that   a  stronger  exploitation   of   external  «network-based»  economies   with  respect   to  internal
«bureaucracy-based» economies [Chandler 1977; 1990] is one of the major consequences of the
diffusion of flexible production systems and modular architectures [Sturgeon 2002; Langlois 2002b].
The growing diffusion of the so-called «modular networks» has occurred as a consequence of many
interdependent factors, converging in a coherent set of technological, organizational and institutional
changes. Two were the major success factors of this new model: i) the reduction of fixed-capital sunk
costs, thanks to the possibility to quickly and economically re-allocate the existing productive capacity
according to market dynamics [Sturgeon 2002];  ii) a greater speed of innovation, thanks to the
increasing returns generated by the growing specialization of firms on a limited number of core
competences [Prahalad e Hamel 1990]. As far as the first point is concerned, nowadays it is
recognized to be essential for many firms in many industries to posses a strong and diversified
network of suppliers, because in the prevailing market conditions it is usually not possible to plan
production flows beyond a limited time horizon. By resorting to suppliers, client firms can increase
production without the need to incur in fixed-capital investments, or decrease it without destroying
existing capacity, because suppliers, having themselves a strong and diversified network of clients,
can compensate the declining demand of one client firm with that of many others. Thanks to these
different and partially overlapping networks, economies of scale are not achieved anymore internally
as in the vertically-integrated firm [Chandler 1990], but externally through the interaction of clients
and suppliers. As far as the second point is concerned, innovation is fostered also by the diffusion of
decentralized (cooperative and competitive) search processes which are typical of these networks.
These processes are sustained also by a reduction of entry barriers, as newcomers can make use of the
available capacity of suppliers to enter the market. 
In order to realize the advantages of modular networks, two main preconditions must be fulfilled. The
first one is the reduction of coordination costs among different firms made possible through
information technologies and internationalization of markets. The convergence process of national
3economies, favoring a growing extension of markets, has created wider opportunities for deeper
specialization and horizontal integration over different markets, i. e. for stronger economies of
scope; while   information technologies have reduced the push towards vertical integration, by
separating, through networks, the achievement of scale economies from internal growth of firms. In
the new context the internal resources of firms focus on developing and exploiting, over different
market and products, core competences and specializations, while vertical integration is not
anymore decisive, and the production of intermediate inputs is more and more often outsourced.
The second precondition concerns the existence of standards, and it is fulfilled when products are
available that posses a stable and open architecture, which is also codified and shared by the main
competitors of one industry. The need for standards depends from the fact that in modular networks
cooperation is assured by market mechanisms, that require, to work properly, a flux of codified
information (specifying the technical, commercial and operative details of each transaction), which
is more easily achieved if standards are available. The fulfillment of these two preconditions
(through information technologies and internationalization on one side, and modular architectures
paving the way for a wider use of standards on the other) has freed modular networks from
geographical constrains, making them more efficient (with respect to more geographically-clustered
networks, such as industrial districts) in a context of growing international trade, and helping a huge
re-allocation of productive capacity, with the emergence of new global leaders in many industries
2.  
Even if that of modular networks is indeed a success story, nonetheless any organizational model is
the outcome of a partial and temporary equilibrium, whose boundaries are defined by the particular
conditions that have produced it and reveal themselves in the trade-offs to which this model is
subject. As we have underlined above, in the case of modular production we need the product
architecture to be relatively well known and stable for the discovery process of innovation to be
partitioned among independent (and partially uncoordinated) agents, yielding what Henderson and
Clark  [1990]   call  «modular  innovation». This  stability  is  essential   to   avoid  the disruptive
consequences of the parallel discovery processes, going on in each module, on the global
performance of the product, but such a level of reliability is more a consequence than a starting
point of the discovery process [Baldwin e Clark 1997: 86]. When we are confronted with a new
product or technology an early and definitive adoption of a specific architecture implies a higher
probability of performance losses. In fact, if interdependencies between components are not well
known, that architecture can partition subsets of components without taking properly into account
2 For example, since the half of the Nineties the electronic industry assisted to the spectacular growth of a set of 5
suppliers (Solectron, Flextronics, Sanmina/SCI, Celestica, Jabil Circuit), which have been able to gain increasing
market's shares offering to the (former) final assemblers the complete («turn-key») production of their products, while
the latter renounced in many cases completely to their internal productive capacity, selling all their plants to the former
[Sturgeon 2002]. 
4those   interdependencies,   thus   causing  unexpected   and  undesired  feedbacks   over  the  global
functioning of the product. In order to overcome these deficiencies we need to recombine
components without the constrain of a fixed architecture, and rather focusing exactly on the test of
alternative architectures. 
The general problem we face is that of the connection between the way in which a search process is
carried out, and the possible outcomes of the research itself. From an evolutionary perspective this
connection is not surprising, because it widely recognized that innovation is a path dependent
process, i. e. one in which the point where we are determines where we can get to in a given amount
of time. Path dependency implies that not all the possible points of the «innovation space» are
immediately and equally accessible to all agents, and consequently that the latter have generally
different «visions» of the same problem, which on its turn means that they search using different
strategies and from different starting points. Following this perspective, the trade-offs of alternative
search strategies and their consequences on search performance have been studied and discussed by
a recent strand of economic literature. These contributions have showed that search processes in
complex environments are exposed to a trade-off between speed of exploration (which must be
higher if selective pressure is higher) and quality of results (which is lower if the search process is
faster)  [Marengo et al. 1999: 15; Frenken, Marengo and Valente 1999: 12; Marengo and Dosi
2003]. In particular Marengo and Dosi [2003: 17] have demonstrated that the size of the smallest
subproblem of a given problem (which represents a measure of the time requested to solve that
problem [Holland 1975; Page 1996]) is weakly decreasing in the number of «satisfying» solutions, i.
e. those accepted «as good» by the search agent [Marengo and Dosi 2003: 17]. This trade-off is
stronger if the problem to be solved is highly complex (i. e. if the interdependencies between the
different parts of the problem make it very difficult to separate it in a set of simpler sub-problems
[Simon 2002]), while less complex problems can be solved quickly with a smaller loss of
performance. As a consequence of this trade-off, in highly selective environments those strategies
are more productive that (all other things being equal) pursue a finer decomposition of the original
problem, even if they incur in a lower probability to reach the best solution for that problem.
Frenken, Marengo and Valente [1999] have showed through micro-simulations the effects of this
trade-off on a population of agents exposed to a selection process that acts on the basis of the
different performance of solutions achieved through alternative search strategies. Agents that use
search strategies based on finer decompositions of the problem generally dominate agents using a
global strategy, thanks to the higher speed of the former in reaching «satisfying» levels of fitness,
while the latter reach the highest fitness over a longer period. As a consequence, the advantage of a
finer decomposition will emerge only if the selective pressure on agents is strong enough to «kill»
5agents pursuing a coarser decomposition before their reach the best solution. In this sense, selection
pushes against the long-period performance of the search process, while it enhances its short-period
performance.
Other works have extended these general results to the analysis of product development and
modularity [Dosi, Levinthal and Marengo 2002; Ethiraj and Levinthal 2003; Frenken 2001; 2004],
highlighting two fundamental facts:
1. The complexity of innovation (conceived as a collective discovery process going on through
variation and selection) changes during the life-cycle of one product or technology; in general,
complexity will be higher during the first stages of product/technology development, when
agents do not dominate fully the task and the discovery process is exposed to frequent failures
because of the existence of unforeseen connections among different parts of the task; it will be
lower when the product's or technology's architecture is  stable enough to be efficiently
modularized, opening the opportunity to exploit the increasing returns yielded by the division of
«innovative labor».
2. There are different  conceivable search strategies  to  explore the «landscape» of possible
innovations: at one side of the spectrum we have a completely decentralized search strategy, in
which the discovery process is subdivided among many agents which compete in a (at least
partially) uncoordinated fashion to solve the different parts of the «innovative puzzle»; at the
other side we have a fully centralized strategy, in which the discovery process is planned and
centrally controlled, and the different parts of the puzzle are solved together, in order to
minimize the probability of unexpected negative feedbacks.
A combination of the two alternatives exposed above defines four possible situations which can be
summarized as in Table 1. In general, a decentralized search process offers a higher speed of
adaptation (i. e. a faster performance increase), all other things being equal, and especially when it
can exploit the potential of parallel search, through which many competing agents can explore a
bigger portion of the innovative possibilities (even if at a higher cost because of redundancy). The
comparative performance of the two strategies depends on the development stage of the technology
or product which is undergoing innovation: centralized search helps finding solutions with a higher
fitness at the cost of a slower discovery process, while the fitness of the solutions yielded by the
decentralized strategy will be lower, when compared to the first ones, when the complexity of
innovation is higher. Thus a lack of coordination among agents can represent a big gap in the initial
phases of development of a new product or technology. 
6Table 1. Relationship between the complexity of innovation and the performance of alternative search strategies
Search strategy
Complexity of innovation 
Higher  Lower 
Decentralized
(market)
Higher adaptation speed when compared to centralized strategy
(fitness increase very fast at the beginning of the search process)
Higher fitness' loss
(stronger damages caused by
uncontrolled  interdependencies)
Low fitness' loss 





(fitness increase very slow at the beginning of the search process)
Highest  fitness
(stronger control over interdependencies)
The main drawback of decentralized search in situations of higher complexity is to accept too many
local   innovations   from   different   agents,   without   being  able  to   control   for   their   reciprocal
compatibility
3. This trade-off is not linear, i. e. not necessarily in situations of higher complexity
more centralized strategies will prevail: their advantages could not be able to reveal themselves if
the selective pressure is too strong, simply because the slower centralized agents are removed from
competition before they can take the lead. In other terms, the combination of a highly selective
environment and a decentralized search process can produce negative effects on innovation in the
development of a complex technology: if «decentralized» agents are systematically selected because
the selective pressure is high, the average quality of the product or technology will be lower in the
long run. 
Our schema is of course extremely simplifying. In particular we have assumed a fixed structure (and
complexity) of the task, while in real innovation processes complexity can be defined only in
connection with the amount of knowledge possessed by the agents. The complexity of a technology
contains an inherently subjective component, and should be conceived more properly as the
outcome of  a dynamic interconnection between the «objective»  dimension of technological
problems and the «subjective» exploration strategies of those problems. When a high coherence
between the objective and subjective dimension is achieved, the problem is not anymore locally (i.
e.  for that agent and that environment) complex. Given these premises, the trade-offs of our schema
give rise, from a dynamic point of view, to an open evolutionary process, which is based on two
main cyclical phases:
1. architectural analysis and development of the product or technology, whose goal is to identify a
satisfying decomposition of that product or technology in functional and physical components; in
this phase, if local search processes are indeed necessary and useful, they must be strictly
coordinated and thus, following the taxonomy proposed by Henderson and Clark [1990], in this
3 On this point see Milgrom and  Roberts [1995].
7phase architectural innovation is prevailing; 
2. architecture  exploration: once  that   a  stable  decomposition  is   achieved,  the   necessity to
coordinate local discovery processes becomes lower and these can be entrusted to independent
agents; following Henderson and Clark [1990], in this phase modular innovation prevails.
The adoption of a modular design is thus coincident with a process of complexity reduction, rather
than with one of complexity management as Ethiraj and Levinthal [2003: 1] seem to suggest,
because the proper complexity management lies in the dynamical cycle between architectural and
modular innovation, which alternate in different moments of a product's life-cycle. Because of the
inherent and inescapable non-linearities of evolution at every level of reality, unexpected variations
in internal and external factors can indeed force agents to re-frame even the most stable and
affordable design. This necessity can emerge, for example, when we need to extend the duration,
resistance or performance of one product. In these cases it is likely that, in order to reach our goal,
we have to introduce innovations in one module which can act negatively on the performance of
other modules, showing the existence of (now relevant but previously neglected) interactions which
must be adequately deal with if we want to obtain the expected result. Since we are moving in an
unexplored territory, it is not possible to exclude that we need to re-discuss and re-structure the
whole product architecture. This possibility highlights that complexity can never be completely
deleted in a complex world as ours, and consequently, even if modular architectures are very useful,
the innovation process can never be perfectly and uniquely modular
4.  
The limits of modularity are thus the consequence of a more general principle: when we confront
with complex problems every modularization is necessarily limited and imperfect. A perfect
modularization could be accomplished only if there where no interdependencies between different
modules, but this eventuality coincides with a situation of «non complexity»
5. In order to see that we
confront with complex phenomena we can focus on the non linear connections linking the different
domains in which the concept of modularity can be defined when it is applied to firms, namely: i)
4 The limits of modularity are seldom discussed, especially in the management literature. An exception is represented by
Fleming and Sorenson [2001a; 2001b; 2003; 2004], who have suggested to extend the idea of the life-cycle of
technologies [Abernathy and Utterback 1978; Klepper 1997], in order to include the possibility of multiple dynamical
development cycles, carried on through successive «modularizations» and «integrations», where the former help in
controlling complexity by making technologies more stable, and the latter become necessary when the returns of the
discovery process in the frame of a given modular architecture decrease. 
5 A more detailed explanation of this assertion goes beyond the scope of this paper. In order to give a hint on this point
we can refer to Simon's [1962] original concept of «nearly decomposable» systems, which is based on the idea that the
distinction between the faster micro-dynamics occurring inside highly interconnected subsystems (i. e. what we call
modules) and the slower macro-dynamics occurring between those subsystems allows a rigorous separation of time
scales in describing the whole system. Here we can remark that the violation of time (and space) scale separation is
exactly a necessary condition for the emergence of complex systems [Bar-Yam 1997: 89-95], and thus complexity
occurs because of the approximative validity of the distinction between inside-modules and between-modules dynamics.
8technology, in which modularity is a property of product and process design; ii) organization, in
which modularity deals both with internal configuration of organization and with organizational
boundaries; iii) knowledge processes, in which this notion regards individual and collective problem
solving strategies in complex environments. The underlying hypothesis of the majority of existing
studies on this topic is that there is a strong linear connection between these three domains
6. On the
other hand recent contributions [Brusoni and Prencipe 2001] have suggested that modularization in
one of these dimensions doesn't imply a parallel trend in the others. For example, in modular
production systems it is very often necessary, for the information flows and problem solving
processes   to   work   properly,   that   some   firms   act   as   «system   integrators»,   developing   the
«architectural» knowledge which is necessary to coordinate the activities of the single components'
producers
7. Generally this role is played by the final assemblers, which consequently tend to focus
progressively   on   design,   R&D   and   marketing   activities,   while   they   outsource   production.
Modularization in technology doesn't exclude, in other terms, the need for cognitive integration, and
the lack of correspondence between the two dimensions helps to explain why some activities (as
design) cannot be modularized and outsourced as easily as others [Brusoni and Prencipe 2001: 195].
From the point of view of external cooperation, the «persistence» of cognitive integration implies
the need of a tight coordination between cooperating firms, which goes far beyond standard market
transactions as conceived by mainstream theory, and involves trust and other relational factors,
which cannot be completely dispensed with even if transactions are based on an extensive use of
codified information and standards.  
2. Rationale of the model
Our model is intended to represent the trade-offs of alternative search strategies in a dynamic
competitive context, i. e. one where firms have to cope continuously with external solicitations
coming from both market competition and  technological change. Since there is not an unique
optimal strategy, our goal is  to identify a set of  factors whose variation can explain the prevalence
of alternative strategies in different situations. In order to achieve this goal, as the problem is indeed
very general and involves potentially many interconnected domains, we need to narrow our scope.
We did this firstly by focusing on the comparison between decentralized and centralized search
strategies, i. e. leaving aside further potential differences; and secondly by evaluating this
6 See for example Nightingale [2000], Schilling e Steensma [2001], Galunic and Eisenhardt [2001], but also Baldwin
and Clark [1997], while a more mixed judgment is given by Langlois [2002b].
7 The necessity of cognitive and relational «hubs» has been detected in other kind of production networks, as industrial
districts [Lombardi 2003], and it has been recently recognized as a more general feature of social networks [Barabási e
Bonabeau 2003].
9comparison in the context of a concrete organizational alternative, namely that of internal versus
outsourced production. In particular, we compare firms that produce internally the components of
which their final product is made up, with firms that buy the same components from the market.
Our goal is thus to compare the performance of the two alternative production patterns just
described (which could be labeled respectively as «verticalized» and «deverticalized») competing in
the same environmental conditions. By doing this, our model focuses only on one of the possible
ways in which the alternative between centralization and decentralization can manifest in the
domain of organization. There are indeed many other contexts in which this comparison could be
usefully performed
8.   
The dynamics of the model is generated by technological innovation, which is represented
according to an idea originally proposed by Sah and Stiglitz [1986]. Their model is an attempt to
deal with the problem of decisional architecture through a very simple representation. The notion of
architecture means here the pattern of connections between the units that contribute to a decisional
process, with a particular reference to the distribution  of authority, information flows and
elaboration capacity. The model compares two alternative architectures: i) poliarchy, i. e. a system
where many competing units can pursue projects independently one from the other; ii) hierarchy, i.
e. a system where only some agents can decide whether to pursue one project, while others are
charged to supply useful information to those who decide. If agents are subjects to informational
and cognitive limits, when they have to evaluate innovation projects they can make two kind of
mistakes: i) to reject projects that should be accepted because they are found (ex post) to yield
positive results; ii) to accept projects that should have been rejected because they subsequently fail
and eventually cause damage. The two typologies of errors can be assimilated to Type I and Type II
errors in the standard theory of statistical inference. The two architecture have a different bias
towards the two typologies of errors. Given the same set of agents, those organized in polyarchies
will collectively tend to make more Type II errors, because this architecture has lower resources  for
evaluating one project, while it admits that one rejected project can be accepted by another agent.
On the other hand agents organized in hierarchies have a stronger bias towards Type I errors,
because   they  accept   a   lower   number   of   projects,   and   loose   consequently  some   favorable
opportunities, while they accept projects which have on the average better results thanks to their
better ability to monitor and evaluate the projects themselves.
The two architectures are confronted with the problem to evaluate and eventually adopt one project
picked up from a portfolio of N alternative projects. Each project has a net return x , which can
8For example, decentralized architectures are feasible inside single organizations too, if these adopt non-bureaucratic
configurations, open to frequent recombinations of internal resources, as well as competition and parallel search
processes [Simon 1991].
10be positive or negative. The density function of projects, with respect to their return, is gx . The
probability that one project is selected is denoted by p , and its value depends from the return of
that project. The function px is called screening function for the projects. In the simplest case
this function can find a linear formulation, for a project i , as px=ppxxi− , where
=E[x] is the expected value of each project given the density function of the initial portfolio,
and px denotes  the  partial  derivative  with  respect  to x ,  evaluated for x=xi− .   In  a
condition of imperfect information and bounded rationality of the agents, we have that px1 . 
The selection process occurs differently in each of the two architectures. In polyarchies projects are
posted randomly to the decisional units: if one project is rejected by one unit, another one can
examine it and eventually adopt it; if it is accepted, it cannot be anymore evaluated and adopted by
other units; no project can be examined twice. The selection is process is thus limitedly parallel, and
the total probability of one project to be adopted is equal to the sum of the probabilities that it is
adopted by each unit, conditioned by the probability that the same project is rejected by the other
units. In the case of two units this probability is f
P=px1−px px=px2−px
(where P stands for polyarchy), under the condition that the probability of adoption is the same
for every unit. In hierarchies each project goes through a double screening, i. e. it is firstly examined
by a lower-level unit and, if accepted by this one, it is submitted to a higher-level unit which re-
examines the project and takes the final decision. The selection process is serial, and the  probability
of adoption is given by the joint probability that the project is accepted by both of the two levels. In
the case of two units with equal probabilities of adoption the joint probability is  f
H=p
2x ,
where H stands for hierarchy. 
Limiting themselves to the two-units case and assuming identical screening functions for the two
architectures, Sah and Stiglitz [1986] derive the main implications of this model. In particular they
demonstrate that: i) given the same initial portfolio, polyarchy selects a higher number of projects
when compared to hierarchy; ii) a worse initial portfolio implies a worsening in the performance of
polyarchy with respect to hierarchy. If the first point is more evident, the second can be explained as
follows. Let's define z10 as the return of a successful project and −z20 as the return of an
unsuccessful project; p1=pz1 is the probability that the successful project is adopted, and
p2=p−z2 is the probability that the unsuccessful project is adopted, with p1p2 ; finally
 is the proportion of successful projects in the initial portfolio. If  Y
s=E[xf
s] is the total
return yielded by the projects adopted by one of the two architectures (where s=P stands for
polyarchy   and s=H stands   for   hierarchy),   and Y=Y
P−Y
H ,   we   obtain   that
11Y=2[z1 p11−p1−z21− p21−p2] . From this formula we can derive that: i) polyarchy
performs better  when the value of  the  initial  portfolio,  which is  represented by the ratio
a=z1/z21− , is higher; ii) for «neutral» portfolios (i. e. those in which  z1=z21−
and thus a=1 ) polyarchy performs better only if 1−p1p2 (remembering that p1p2 ).
This result can be explained if we think that 1−p1 e p2 are respectively the probability of
making Type I errors (reject a good project) and that of making Type II errors (adopt a bad project).
If the former probability is higher than the latter, the architecture which yields a greater reduction of
Type I errors (i. e. polyarchy) will perform better because it rejects a higher share of bad projects; if
the latter is higher than the former, hierarchy will outperform polyarchy, because of its opposite bias
towards a greater reduction of Type II errors
9.
At this point it is quite easy to see that this model captures the trade-off between alternative
strategies that we have mentioned in the previous paragraph. From the fact that f P f H for
px1  we can draw two main implications: i) polyarchies accept a higher share of projects at
the cost of a lower expected return for each project
10, exactly as we supposed that decentralized
architectures should behave; ii) symmetrically hierarchies reach on the average a higher return at the
cost of a lower number of adopted projects, which can lead to a lower total return, representing
fairly well the fact that centralized architectures are slower than decentralized ones, as we have
advocated above. The total return for each architecture is thus the result of two independent factors,
which combine differently in the two architectures: i) the average value of the adopted projects; ii)
the number of adopted projects. Consequently hierarchy prevails only if the combination between
the share of bad projects and the ratio between the damages caused by bad projects and the benefits
of good projects is such as to cause for polyarchies a loss which is higher than the additional return
stemming from the higher number of good projects which the latter adopt. This particular conditions
can be interpreted as those prevailing in the initial phases of development of a new product or
technology, as well as, more in general, in those phases in which architectural recombination is
occurring. In those conditions agents face a higher difficulty in finding good solutions and can
undergo strong damages because of wrong projects.
9 Drawing conclusions on the comparative performance of the two architectures becomes more difficult if we admit that
units, foreseeing their own limits, can rationalize their decisional criteria [Sah and Stiglitz 1986: 271-275]. Yet we must
note that, if we admit this possibility, the informational and cognitive limits assumed in the model loose most of their
explanatory force, especially from a dynamical point of view. In our model we refer to the basic version of the model,
and assume consequently that informational and cognitive limits cannot be completely endogenized and optimized in the
decision process.
10 Even if Sah and Stiglitz don't treat the last point explicitly, it follows from the observation that, if f P f H for the
same project, when we have two projects i and j with respective return xi and x j , f Pxi= f Hx j only
if x jxi .
123. Model description
Our   model   represents   the   competitive   dynamics   of   one   industry,  in   which   there  are  two
subpopulations of firms with different characteristics: i) «verticalized», i. e. firms that produce
internally the components of their final product; ii) «deverticalized», i. e. firms that buy one or more
of those components from the market. More in detail, the model contains the following main
entities:
1. one  industry,   which   produces   one   final   product P ,   made   of n components,   so   that
P={c1,...,cn} ;
2. a set of n1 sectors, i. e. n intermediate sectors which produce components plus one final
sector;
3. firms  that populate the n1 sectors and compete on the respective markets;
4. final demand which is specified as an aggregate entity whose variation depends on the average
quality and price of the final products supplied by firms;
5. finally, a set of T periods in which firms compete, for each period t , on the basis of the
existing conditions at t−1 , determining in this way the conditions of the industry at t1 . 
In the following paragraphs we describe in detail the characteristics of our model, in order to
introduce the results of a set of «agent-based» micro-simulations performed on a first and partial
computational implementation of the same model, which are subsequently discussed in par. 4-6
11. 
3.1. Market dynamics
The products supplied by the final firms (i. e. those operating in the final sector) are homogeneous
with respect to their final use, but heterogeneous for quality characteristics and price [Lancaster
1966 and 1971]. To represent this kind of heterogeneity we can describe each product as a set of
three elements: i) a vector of technical characteristics; ii) a vector of service characteristics for the
final user; iii) a map linking the two vectors [Saviotti and Metcalfe 1984]. Gallouj and Weinstein
[1997] have extended this frame to include a vector of capabilities which is combined with the
technical characteristics of inputs to obtain the service characteristics of the output. This solution
has been adopted by Ciarli and Valente [2003] to represent productive processes in a model with
11  The model has been implemented in LSD (Laboratory for Simulation Development),  a simulation environment
specifically designed to develop and analyze «agent-based» economic models. This tool has been developed by an
Italian researcher, Marco Valente, and is particularly suited for building economic models. For additional information
see http://www.business.aau.dk/~mv/. For an introduction to the theoretic foundations of «agent-based» modeling we
can refer to Lane [1993], Axtell [2000], Valente [2002] and Tesfatsion [2003].
13similar characteristics to the one presented here. In our case, to keep as simple as possible our
model, the productive process has not been fully specified  as above, but with a simplified schema
which is nevertheless perfectly compatible with the models just mentioned, and could be easily
extended in that direction. In particular, to each component ci of the final product it is associated
a value xi1 , which measures the contribution of that component to the global performance of
the final product in terms of service characteristics for the final user (i. e. what for sake of brevity
we will call from now on its «quality»). The quality  Y of the final product for each firm j of
the final sector is then equal to
12:





where the exponents ai0 are parameters that represent the weight of the quality of each
component on the quality of the final product, and the values of the xi are determined by the
dynamics of technological innovation (see par. 3.4). We should note that the functional form of the
expression [1] is supermodular [Milgrom and Roberts 1995],  i. e. it takes into account the
interdependency between the qualities of the different components: according to the definition of
supermodularity, an increase in the quality of one component yields a higher contribution to global
quality when the quality of the other components is on a similar level too. 
Final demand   is determined by an aggregate index which increases in direct proportion with
technological progress, since innovation is embodied in the service characteristics of the final
products sold by firms operating in the final sector [Ciarli and Valente 2003]. More specifically













where H1 is   a  constant; Prd j1 is   a  variable  that   represents   the   productive   capacity
achieved by  each  of the m final firms; a p and ai , positives,  represent  respectively  the
elasticities with respect to variations of price and quality of components;  P is the average price
and  xi is the average quality of the components, weighted on the market shares of the m firms
operating for the final market:  P=∑
j=1
m
P j∗MS j and  xi=∑
j=1
m
xij∗MS j , where P j and xij are
determined respectively by firms' costs (see below, par. 3.3) and by the dynamics of innovation (see
below, par. 3.4). 
12 For the sake of simplicity temporal indexes are always omitted if in the same equation there are not variables referred
to different time periods. 
14Competition in the final sector is based on the global «performance» of products, measured by the
quality of their components and the price of the product itself. For each firm a «potential» market
share, based on the comparative performance of its product with respect to the others, is computed
as follows:









Y j is a competitiveness index for firm j and ∑ I is the sum of the
values of I j for all the m firms of the final sector.
Taking into account the size of final demand and the potential market share of the firm, the output
produced by each final firm j for each period t is given by:






The meaning of the expression [4] can be explained as follows. The quantity produced by the firm
j is a fraction of total demand, determined by two distinct factors, whose weight is regulated by
the parameter 01 : i) the comparative performance of the product supplied by the firm,
represented   by MS j
pot ;   ii)   the   market   position   of   the   firm,   represented   by   the   ratio
Prd j/∑ Prd . We suppose, in other terms, that consumers can be characterized by a higher or
lower level of inertia, i. e. a stronger or weaker ability to recognize the improvements occurring in
the performance of the products supplied by each firm, and a corresponding weaker or stronger bias
towards products supplied by firms with a stronger market position, irrespective of their relative
quality and price. Once Q j is computed, it is possible to determine the final market share for each
firm in the period t simply as:





Firms in the final sector are divided in two subpopulations which differ for the productive pattern
they adopt. For each component ci , each firm has two options: i) to produce it directly; ii) to buy
it on the market from one (and only one) of the firms operating in the n intermediate sectors. In
the first case the quality of that component is determined by the innovation process that occurs
inside the final firm. In the second case the final firm includes in its final product the quality of the
15component bought on the market, i. e.:
 [6]  xij=yik
for each final firm j which buys the component ci from the supplier k operating in the i-th
intermediate sector.
The selection of suppliers by final firms occurs on the basis of the «perceived quality» of their
components and of the price at which the former wish to sell. With regard to the first point, final
firms have an imperfect ability to read the real quality of the components produced by the potential
suppliers [Valente 1999]. Perceived quality ˚ yi is given by:
[7]  ˚ yi~N yi, ˚ yi ,
where  ˚ yi=1−MaxLearn∗DevLearn∗yi
13. If the selection is made on the basis of perceived
quality, the final firm must nevertheless compete on the basis of the real quality of the components
it has bought. Consequently firms can make wrong choices with a probability which is higher when
the ability to evaluate ex ante the quality of components is lower, i. e. when  ˚ yi is higher. 
We can now consider how the price of the component ci enters in the selection procedure of the
supplier. On the one side final firms compare the price offered by the potential supplier ( pci )
with the average price of suppliers in the previous period (  pci[t−1] ), while on the other side they
compare the perceived quality of the potential supplier ( ˚ yi ) with the average perceived quality in
the previous period (  ˚ yi[t−1] ). Then they choose that supplier only if the expected benefits on
quality exceed or at least equate the eventual additional costs:
[8] 








A second condition to be satisfied is that the potential supplier must have enough productive
capacity available to satisfy the needs of the client firm, i. e. Prd k
avPrd j . This condition limits
the number of clients a supplier can serve, and can eventually force final firms to a second best
choice with respect to quality. Once the first choice of one supplier is made at t0 , final firms can
change supplier in each of the subsequent periods comparing price and quality of the other potential
suppliers with those of the actual one. Also in this case the new supplier is selected only if it yields a
quality increase which is at least equal to the eventual cost increase and if it has enough productive
capacity  to satisfy the demand, but this choice entails additional uncertainty, because final firms can
read with no distortions only the quality of their actual suppliers, while that of the potential
13 On the basis of this expression, the average distance of perceived and real quality increases in direct proportion to the
value of the parameter DevLearn , equal for all firms, with 0DevLearn1 ; and in inverse proportion to the
value of MaxLearn .
16alternative is known only imperfectly, according to the expression [7]. For this reason we introduce
three additional conditions which aim to capture the fact that generally final firms would be
unwilling to change supplier, even if there is an expected benefit, if the latter is not large enough to
justify the risk of lowering the performance of the firms as a consequence of a wrong choice. More
in detail the conditions to be satisfied are the following:
1. the candidate h must ensure at least an apparent quality improvement over the actual supplier
k : ˚ yih[t]yik [t] ;
2. this improvement must be relevant: to obtain a non arbitrary threshold we assume that this
condition is satisfied if
 ˚ yih[t]−yik [t]
yik [t]
RND , where RND is a random number extracted from a
uniform distribution in the interval {0,1} ( RND~U 0,1 );
3. the competitive performance of the firm is not positive: looking at the difference between the
market share of the leader firm l and that of a final firm j ( MS=MSl−MS j ), the firm
j will search a new supplier if MSRND , with RND defined as above.
We must note that, since the three conditions are stochastic, final firms will generally make different
decisions in similar conditions. If the three conditions are jointly satisfied, the selection process of a
new supplier goes through the following steps: 
1. candidates are ordered for decreasing values of ˚ yi ;
2. following this order, the client firm search the first supplier with available productive capacity;
3. the client firm reads the price offered by the candidate supplier;
4. if the price offered by the candidate supplier is lower than that of the actual supplier, the
candidate is selected and the search process is concluded;
5. if the price is higher but the expected improvement in quality is higher or equal to the price
increase, the candidate is selected and the search process is concluded;
6. if neither of the two conditions at step 4) or 5) are satisfied, the client firms asks the candidate
supplier to specify a new price, lower than the first one;
7. if with the new price the candidate doesn't satisfy at least one of the conditions specified at steps
4) or 5), the candidate is rejected and the next one is examined;
8. if none of the candidates satisfies at least one of the conditions at step 4) or 5) the client firm
retains the old supplier.
173.3. Costs, investments and profit
We have explained above how the price enters in the market competition of the final firms. On its
part the price offered by the final firm j is determined by the unitary variable costs:
[9]  P j=c u j1mkp j , 
where mkp j0 is the mark-up of firm j and c u j is the unitary cost of the same firm. The
value of the mark-up can be controlled by firms, above a minimum threshold equal for all of them.
In particular we suppose that firms can increase their mark-up when cost reductions due to technical
progress occur, in order to appropriate of (at least) some of the potential benefits for consumers. If
c u j[t1]c u j[t] the new mark-up is computed as follows:
[10] mkp j[t1]=[
mkp j[t]
mkp j[t]∗c u j[t]−c u j
c u j[t1] ]
/2
where c u j=c u j[t1]−c u j[t] , and the second term of the sum on the right hand side of the
expression [10] is the mark-up value which should be necessary to keep unchanged the price after a
cost reduction. The increase of the mark-up is constrained by an additional condition, which is
fulfilled with the following probability:
[11]  Pr[mkp j[t1]mkp j[t]]=Pr[RNDMS]
with RND and MS defined as above. In other terms the tendency to increase mark-ups will be
stronger the smaller is the distance of one firm from the leader firm in terms of market shares,  and
this tendency will be thus highest when the firm is the market leader itself. In a dynamical
competitive environment this kind of opportunistic behavior can be hidden to consumers by quality
improvements and price reductions which can be higher than those of the competitors, because they
are financed by higher volumes of resources (as we shall see more in detail below). It is
consequently not irrational for firms to pursue such a behavior, if they can hide to market and
competitors their true production costs when they have a dominant position, and if they can revert
their strategy, lowering their own prices, when they perceive relevant negative signals from their
sales. The only constrain imposed by the model on this regard is that leader firms are not perfectly
reactive to these signals. On the other hand, the behavior of the followers is opposite to that of the
leader: they will tend to reduce their mark-up down to the minimum threshold to re-gain market
shares through price reduction. The probability that the reduction of mark-up occurs depends from a
complementary condition with respect to the expression [11]: 
[12] Pr[mkp j[t1]mkp j[t]]=Pr[RNDMS] .
In other terms this condition is fulfilled with a higher frequency for those firms which have a wider
18market share gap from the leader.
The second factor used to compute price is unitary cost, which is calculated differently depending
on the productive pattern of the firm:









where i=1 if the  i-th component is bought from the market, and i=0 if it is produced
internally; pci is the price offered by the supplier for the component i ;  t j is an index of the
technological level achieved by the firm in the production process, whose computation is specified
below. Regarding the costs of external supplies, we must precise that the prices offered by  suppliers
is computed in the same way as in the expression [9], i. e. it depends from the unitary variable costs
and mark-up of the suppliers. The comparative (static) convenience of «internalized» versus
«externalized» production depends from the relative value of the terms appearing in the expression
[13]. In particular this convenience is determined by the value of the price offered by the supplier
k , pcik=1 1
tk
1mkpk , compared with the efficiency achieved by the process technology
of the final firm j , 1
1
t j
. In order to be pcik1
1
t j
, we must have that tk is higher than
t j by a difference which must be sufficient to compensate the presence of the mark-up of the
supplier, i. e. t j 1
11/tk∗1mkpk−1
or alternatively tk 1
11/t j/1mkpk−1
.
The unitary variable cost enters of course also in the computation of the total costs of the firm,
which are obtained as follows:
[14] C j=c u jQ jc fix j
with Q j defined by the expression [4] and c fix j which stands for the fixed costs of the firm:







with i and Prd j defined as above, and c trans , c tec and c gen equal parameters for all the
firms. These parameters represent respectively the fixed costs deriving from transactions with
suppliers, those deriving from the technological characteristics of production, determining the
minimum scale of plants in the industry, and the general administrative costs. All these costs are
fixed in the sense that they don't depend from the output produced in each period, but they change in
proportion with the productive capacity of the firm ( Prd j ). Further we have that c transc tec ,
19so that firms relying on external suppliers have lower fixed costs with respect to firms which
produce components internally. 
Once total costs are computed, profits of the firm j are given by:
[16]   j=R j−Inv j ,
where R j=Q j∗P j−C j . Investments Inv j are on their part calculated as follows:
[17]  Inv j={












where 0,1S invest j0,9 and cum j=∑
t=0
t=s
 jt are cumulated profits until the period s   by the
firm j . Since we don't introduce credit in the model, we suppose that firms, when they are in
difficulty ( R j0 ), can draw on a part of the funds cumulated in the past
14 in order to finance
their own investments. In analogy with the expression [13], the weight of the single components on
investments is equal, and investments are lower for firms which rely on external suppliers, for
which i=1 . The share of revenues to be used for investments S invest is increased if a stochastic
condition is satisfied according to a probability which is similar to that of the expression [11]:
[18] Pr[S invest j[t1]invest j[t]]=Pr[RNDMS]
As a consequence of this expression, the follower firm will tend to increase its share of investments
in order to get more competitive, up to the maximum threshold. The behavior of the leader firm is
also in this case partially myopic, as it holds, in analogy with the expression [12], that:
[19]  Pr[S invest j[t1]invest j[t]]=Pr[RNDMS]
The leader firms will tend to reduce their investments share down to the minimum threshold, as they
can rely generally on a higher amount of investments, because of their higher amount of sales. Once
their overall amount is computed, funds for investments are divided in two separate chapters: i)
technological innovation; ii) increase of productive capacity. The investments in innovation are
computed simply as follows: 
[20]  Inv inn j= j Inv j
with 0 j1 , and investments in productive capacity are determined residually:
[21]  Inv cap j=Inv j−Inv inn j
14 The rule we adopt here is really oversimplified, i. e. we suppose that the investments represent a share of the average
profits of the previous s periods. The funds employed for investments are consequently subtracted from the
cumulated profits: if R jt0 , cum j[s1]=cum j[s]−cum j[s]/s , and if eventually cum j0 the firm is
removed from the market.
20
, if Rj>0
, if Rj≤0Each firm is thus characterized by a different tendency to invest in innovation and consequently in
productive capacity, but this tendency is also conditioned by the prevailing strategies on the market:
[22]   j=[ j∑∗MS]/2
where  j represents the tendency of the single firm to invest in innovation and  ∑∗MS is
the weighted average tendency for final firms. In other terms, firms will tend to adapt to the winning
strategy (i. e. that associated with the larger market shares), without being able to eliminate
completely some irreducible differences which can be explained as a consequence of different
organizational capabilities and cultures. 
As we shall see below, the higher or lower investments in innovation condition, although not
linearly, the speed of technological innovation inside firms. For the moment we focus on the effects




Inv cap jtResCap j , where ∣t∣ represents the number of periods passed since the last increase







1−ic tecc gen∗ , with 1 . The latter parameter governs the
ratio between the resources needed to increase productive capacity (i. e. those necessary to build a
new plant) and the fixed costs determined by this increase (i. e. those necessary to keep efficient the
plant), represented by the first term of the product. 
3.4. The dynamics of innovation
In our model technological innovation regards both the improvement of products and of production
processes. The mechanism through which innovations are adopted and developed in the two cases is
the same, even if they are independent processes, which condition in different ways the competitive
dynamics of the model. Regarding the former, product innovation means an increase in the quality
of the components, which on its part is reflected in the quality of the final product and in the
competitiveness of the firms, as specified in expressions [1] and [4]. Regarding the latter, process
innovation is represented by a simple index of the efficiency level gained by the single firm, which
determines production costs, as specified in the expression [13]. 
Following the representation of Sah and Stiglitz [1986] described above, the dynamics of innovation
is specified through the adoption process of ideas or inventions, which is structured in two steps: i)
the first one involves the selection of ideas, performed through a stochastic process; ii) the second
21one involves the application of ideas, or the real innovation, which gives to the firm a (negative or
positive) payoff. During the first step ideas (for example, in the case of product innovation) are
selected according to the probability given by the following formula:




where xi can be higher or lower (even negative) in the case respectively of a «good» or «bad»
idea; the parameter 0F rate1 represents the failure rate of innovative ideas, giving an indirect
measure of the difficulty the firm faces in developing and improving the quality xi of the
component ci ; and the parameter 0 can be used to enlarge or reduce the strength of the
negative or positive signal that we suppose firms receive from a «good» or «bad» idea respectively.
The overall meaning of the formula is the following: the probability to accept an idea is equal to the
expected proportion of good ideas (represented by the first term of the multiplication on the right
hand side of the expression [23]), increased (or lowered) by the positive (negative) signal that the
firm  receives  from  the  particular   idea  it   is  examining  (given  by  the  second  term  of  the
multiplication). We can reproduce in this way the rationally more conservative behavior of firms
confronted with a higher uncertainty, due to unforeseeable developments regarding the components
undergoing innovation. This tendency is partly contrasted by the fact that a high level of uncertainty




When the failure rate is high, all other things being equal, the difference between the value of a
good idea and the expected value of one idea, and thus the second term of the multiplication in the
expression [23], is increased. We reproduce in this way the fact that, in a situation of higher
difficulty to develop a product, the value of the few good ideas is sensibly higher. 
The parameter F rate is a proxy that tries to represent, although in a very simplified way, the
presence of high levels of complexity in the innovation process. With regard to the development of
the component xi , a value of F rate near the unity stands for a high level of uncontrolled
interdependencies between the development of that component and that of the other ones that
compose the final product. On the contrary a level of F rate near to zero stands for the opposite
situation, in which the single component can be modified without fearing for unforeseeable negative
feedbacks, stemming from uncontrolled interactions with the others. 
Before we can examine the second step of the innovation process, we must make an additional
comment. As we shall see in the next paragraph, the probability to select an idea is lower for final
firms with respect to intermediate firms (i. e. firms operating in the intermediate sectors), and thus
final firms accept on the average a lower number of innovative ideas with respect to suppliers. This
22different tendency implies comparative advantages or disadvantages depending on the parameters
that regulate the innovation process, with a particular regard to the failure rate and to the ratio
between positive and negative payoffs. When the probability to fail is very high and/or bad ideas
yield a relevant damage compared to the benefits of good ideas, a more conservative strategy can be
more effective. 
During the second step of the innovation process, if the idea has been selected according to the
probability specified in the expression [23], it yields to the firm its positive or negative payoff. The
evolution of the positive payoff is non linear in the model, and is represented by a logistic equation:




while the adoption of a bad idea yields a temporary damage, which can be interpreted as a «false
step» in the development cycle of one product, represented in a simpler way as:
[26]  xi[t1]=xi[t]
with 1 , fixed in such a way that the value of the expression [26] is strictly lower than that of
the expression [25]
15. The logistic shape of the positive payoff has been adopted for two reasons: i)
it reproduces the existence of limits in technological progress; ii) it helps to identify different phases
in the development cycle of one product (namely, an initial phase, with limited returns and slow
progress; an «explosion» phase, with increasing exponential returns; a maturity phase, with
progressively decreasing returns), whose existence has found confirmation in many cases; iii) it
allows to introduce in a simple way a variable ( TecR j ), which regulates differently for each firm
the speed of development of its product  depending on the value of its investments. In addition, the
adoption of a bounded increase curve for the variable referring to technological progress is a
guarantee that the simulations of  the model don't produce explosive dynamics. In fact, considering
how the model is built, in the absence of improvements in the quality of the components (variable
xi ) or in the efficiency of the production process (variable t j ), no competitive dynamics is
possible, and the market share of firms cannot change from the initial values. 
A limit of the model can be identified in the supposition that the difficulty to improve components
within a given architecture (measured by F rate ) is independent from their development cycle,
where the latter (as from the expression [25]) concerns the non linear dynamics of the returns from
the innovative efforts of firms. This supposition is clearly unrealistic, as in the models that explore
the links between the diffusion of new products and  the emergence of «dominant designs» [Dosi
1982; Tushman and Rosenkopf 1992] it has been often highlighted that the latter, defining a
15  This condition is necessary in order to guarantee the existence of technological progress, even the slower, in
situations of highest uncertainty, in which failed innovations are the majority. 
23common background for different firms, not only stimulates a higher innovation rate (i. e., in our
model, a lower value of F rate ), but also increases the returns of innovation. At any rate, analysing
the interdependence of these two variables is not necessary for our present goals, while their
separation helps to obtain more general results, because we can examine the combined effects of the
two variables over the entire range of their possible values, without adding specific hypotheses on
the way they connect each other.
The last point to be examined is the role of investments in the innovation process. Given two firms
i and j , TecRiTecR j if and only if Inv inni  Inv inn and Inv inn j  Inv inn , where  Inv inn
is the average investment in innovation. If n and m are respectively the number of final firms











The average investment in innovation is computed summing together final firms and suppliers,
because both compete to innovate the same components. Given the value of the investments of one
firm compared to the average, the rate of technological progress is represented by a random variable
extracted   by   two   different   uniform   distributions: TecR1~U a,b (if Inv inn  Inv inn )   and
TecR2~U b,c (if Inv inn  Inv inn ), with 1abc . As specified by the expression [25],
the real rate is equal to TecR1 or TecR2 only if the firm selects a good idea, while if the idea is
bad the firm faces a regression of its technological level. In addition there is also a third possibility:
when the firm doesn't select any idea
16, quality increases nonetheless according to the expression
[25], through a small incremental improvement that takes place at a rate TecR3~U c,0 , lower
than the one of the firms that introduce a successful innovation. This possibility is introduced in
order to avoid that firms go through a continuous decrease of their technological levels when they
are confronted with high levels of difficulty in improving products and processes. 
3.5. The behavior of suppliers
Firms operating in  intermediate sectors follow in general the same rules as those operating in the
final sector, so that we need only to specify the equations that work differently in the former from
the latter. As we have already mentioned, the first difference between final and intermediate firms
lies in the higher probability for the latter to select an innovative idea regarding product or process




as specified by the expression [23].
24innovation. This probability is given for the intermediate firm k by:
[28] Prk [xi[t1]=xi[t]xi]=Prk[RND{1−F rate∗[e
[xi[t]xi−Exi[t1]]]
}]
with PrkPr j , as it is clear confronting the expressions [28] and [23]. The basic intuition behind
this difference is that «verticalized» production (represented in our case from the final firm that
produce   internally  its   components)   is   linked   to  a  more  integrated   decisional   and  research
architecture, realized through the coordination of the decisional units of the firm. An architecture of
this kind is characterized by a more «conservative» innovation strategy, because many connections
are considered together before a decision is taken. On the opposite side intermediate firms (and
consequently final firms that buy their products) tend to accept a comparatively higher number of
innovative ideas. Their strategy can be explained through the notion of modular innovation: this
firms innovate on the components they produce independently both from their competitor and from
the firms that operate in the other intermediate sectors, and thus collectively tend to explore directly
a wider portion of the innovative landscape. The effectiveness of this strategy depends on the level
of interdependence among different components. The measure for complexity adopted in the
expressions [23] and [28] ( F rate ) should be interpreted as a simplified representation exactly of
the level of interdependence of the functional structure of the different components that build the
final product. As we shall see better below, if this interdependence exceeds a critical threshold, the
gains derived from an extended research among the alternative innovative combinations, made in
parallel by a plurality of competing agents, can be outperformed by those of a more conservative
strategy.
The second difference between intermediate and final firms is that the former face a «real» demand,
i. e. the behavior of their clients is micro-specified in the model. We thus have a different, and





The quantity of output produced by the intermediate firm k is equal to the sum of the quantities
produced for its p clients. Here we adopt for simplicity a fixed proportion of 1:1 between
component and final product: to produce a unit of final product we need a unit of that component.
The price at which intermediate firms sell their product is in the first place equal for all their clients,
and it is computed in the same way as in the expression [9], including also the possibility to change
the mark-up according to the rule specified in the expression [10]. The only difference becomes
apparent when the client firms ask a lower price (see above). In that case intermediate firms
compute the following new price: 
25[30]  P resk={
Pk
 P[t−1]}
with RND and MS defined as above. In other terms, suppliers tend to refuse to lower their
price if they are in a position of leadership in their market, i. e. if MS is small. We leave thus
open the opportunity of a replacement of the leader firms by new entrants and followers, both
readier to catch market opportunities reducing their prices in order to gain (or not to loose) a client. 
Profits of the intermediate firms are computed as in the expression [16], but have to take into
account the eventual price differences among different clients:
 [31]  k=∑
j=1
p
P j∗Q j−C totk−Invk
where P j and Q j are respectively the price offered to and the quantities produced for the single
client j . Regarding the costs, the only difference lies in the fixed ones, which are determined in a
slightly different way from the expression [15]: 
[32] c fixk=Prd k∗ pk∗c transc tecc gen ,
i. e. with transaction costs proportional to the number p of clients, and Prd k which represents
the productive capacity of the firm, computed in the same way as for final firms. 
The last point to consider is the entry mechanism for new firms (while the exit dynamics is the same
of final firms, i. e. the intermediate firm k is removed from the market if cumk0 ). The
entrance of new firms occurs according to a Poisson process
17, allowing to test the differences
produced by different birth rates in the intermediate sectors on the competitive performance of the
final firms. New firms are initialized with values of the fundamental variables (product quality,
technological level, productive capacity, mark-up, investments share, cumulated profits) equal to the
weighted average of the same variables referred to the firms which existed on the market in the
previous period. In this way new firms don't locate themselves on the «frontier» of their sector,
which we assume is hardly reachable by a new entrant, but rather in line with the «state of the art»
of that sector. 
4. Setting the stage: competition of «verticalized» firms 
In order to expose the fundamental competitive dynamics of the model we consider firstly the case
of firms with the same production pattern. Consequently, even if we are now going to analyze the
17 Namely, the probability of n new entries obeys to the following limiting distribution:  Pr [Entry=n]=t
n∗e
−t/n!
where t is the number of periods under consideration, n represents the number of new entries of which we wish to
compute the probability and  represents the intensity of the process, i. e. the expected number of entries in each
period. The latter variable is used in our model to allow a higher or lower number of entries.
26
, if RND>∆MS
, if RND≤∆MSbehavior of «verticalized» firms, our attention will be focused on those variables that characterize
the behavior of firms independently from the advantages or disadvantages of a «verticalized» versus
«deverticalized» production pattern, which will be examined subsequently. In the first place we
examine a competitive context in which there is not the «inertial» effect given by the accumulation
of productive capacity (see the expression [4]). In graph 1 we draw an illustrative path of quality
improvement for one component, determined by the innovation dynamics in a simulation computed
starting from a set of given initial conditions
18 on a sample of 10 «verticalized» firms with identical
initial values for all the (lagged) endogenous variables and parameters. The logistic shape of the
improvements is the one expected from the expression [25], with the value of the quality of the
component c1 that approaches to the maximum ( MaxTec=10 ) at the end of the simulated periods.
Graph 1. An example of the dynamics of quality improvement for the component  c1
The differences among single firms depend both from the stochastic nature of the innovative
process (see the expression [23]) and from the influence of investments (which are different because
of the different amount of profits depending on the respective market shares) on the speed of the
innovation process (see the expression [25]). The quality improvement of the component c1 and the
progressive price reduction allowed by the improvement of the production process (see the
expression [13]) determine the expected growth of demand and of total output, which coincide by
18 The values for which the simulations have been computed, except where differently indicated, are the following:
t j=1 , xi=1 , mkp j=0,3 , ctrans=1 , ctec=100 , cgen=10 , F rate=0,3 , MaxTec=10 . With regard
to demand, we have assumed equal elasticities with value 1 (see expression [2]). In the case of  t j , xi and mkp j
, which are endogenous lagged variables of the model, the values just indicated are used to initialize the simulations.
With regard to xi , to simplify the analysis the possibility of improvement is introduced only for c1, while c2 and  c3













1 501 1001 1501 2001 2501
X1_1 X1_2 X1_3 X1_4 X1_5 X1_6 X1_7 X1_8 X1_9 X1_10definition (see expressions [2] and [4]). The increase of demand and output, as we can see from
graph 2, follows a logistic curve which parallels that of technological progress.
Graph 2. An example of the evolution of final demand (D) and of total output of the industry (Q) as a consequence of
innovation (D=Q by definition)
Graph 3. An example of market shares' dynamics (without effects of cumulated productive capacity) 
The dynamics of technological progress conditions that of the market shares, which are in the first
place determined by the quality of the final product alone, i. e. for =0 (see expression [4]). A
simple comparison of graph 1 with graph 3, where it is represented the market shares dynamics of




















1 501 1001 1501 2001 2501
MS_Fin_1 MS_Fin_2 MS_Fin_3 MS_Fin_4 MS_Fin_5 MS_Fin_6 MS_Fin_7
MS_Fin_8 MS_Fin_9 MS_Fin_10performance. The leader firms (as, for example, the firms n° 6 in the final periods of the simulation)
are also those with a better performance for the component c1
19, while those with the widest gap in
quality (as the firm n° 9) are also those with the lowest market shares. Further, the distribution of
the market shares increases when the qualitative performance diverge (as it is the case until the
1.000
th period of the simulation), while it tend to an even distribution when quality differences
lower (as in the periods between the 1.000
th and 2.500
th time step of the simulation). 
The effect of the introduction of an «inertial» effect due to the accumulation of productive capacity
can be easily verified by graph 4, which represents the average values, for ten simulations repeated
for different values of  , of the standard deviation of the market share of the sample of ten firms
already considered. The higher the value of  , the more the differences between market shares of
firms lower, i. e. we get a «smoothing» of the competitive dynamics, even if market shares are still
proportional to respective qualities. Further, when quality differences between products decrease, as
it is the case in the final periods of the simulations, a stronger weight of cumulated productive
capacity determines the persistence of stronger differences between market shares than in the case
where competition is determined solely by quality, as we can see from the fact that the standard
deviation for =0 tends to decrease more quickly in the final periods when compared to the other
cases.
Graph 4. Connection between the weight of cumulated productive capacity in competition and the distribution of
market shares* 
* Average values of the standard deviation of market shares computed for 10 firms and for 10 simulations repeated for each value of
 .
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DEV_STD_ζ_0.0 DEV_STD_ζ_0.25 DEV_STD_ζ_0.5 DEV_STD_ζ_0.75Now we can verify what happens when we introduce the possibility for firms to change mark-ups,
as it is described by expressions [10] – [12]. This opportunity allows firms that posses relatively
efficient production technologies (see the expression [9]) to widen their profit margins as an
alternative to a price reduction. If a decision of this kind has obvious negative effects on the price
competitiveness of the firm, on the other hand firms can compensate this disadvantage assigning to
investments in innovation a greater part of the additional profit they gain from this decision. In the
latter case they can defend and even strengthen their market leadership simply by producing better
products than their competitors. An example of a dynamics of this kind is depicted in graph 5, that
draws the evolution of market shares when mark-ups are variable, for a simulation computed on 10
firms with the same characteristics as those observed up to this point
20. 
Graph 5. An example of market shares' dynamics in presence of variable mark-ups
The dispersion of market shares is much higher than the one recorded above, with some firms
cumulating an irrecoverable competitive lag during the simulation. Further we add the apparent paradox
for which (as depicted in graph 6) the leading firms are the ones that offer the highest prices. This
paradox is  explained by graph 7, in which we draw the global product performance for each firm, i. e.
the value of the variable I , which takes into account both quality and price, entering directly into the
computation of the market shares (see the expression [3]). A visive comparison of graphs 5 and 7 shows
that market shares are still proportional to product quality: since price is nothing more than a component
of global performance, leading firms occupy their position exactly because they are more able to
strengthen the quality of their components, with a positive effect on global performance which is higher
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MS_Fin_1 MS_Fin_2 MS_Fin_3 MS_Fin_4 MS_Fin_5 MS_Fin_6 MS_Fin_7 MS_Fin_8
MS_Fin_9 MS_Fin_10than the negative effect due to the higher prices. In these conditions the initial gap cannot be anymore
covered by the followers, because a virtuose cycle of positive effects occurs for those firms that are able
to get an initial advantage in process technology or product quality: a higher initial efficiency or quality
makes available a higher amount of funds to invest, and these on their part increase both the product
quality and productive efficiency, thus yielding an increased amount of resources to invest. Further, the
followers cannot fill the gap, even if they increase their tendency to invest, because the bigger returns of
leader firms guarantee a bigger amount of investments even when the latter have a lower tendency to
invest than the former
21.
Graph 6. An example of price dynamics in presence of variable mark-ups
Graph 7. An example of products' global performance dynamics in presence of variable mark-ups
The effects just described of course depend from the elasticity of demand with respect to the
variations of price and quality of the final product (see the expressions [1] – [4]). If we change the
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P_1 P_2 P_3 P_4 P_5 P_6 P_7 P_8 P_9 P_10values of these elasticities we have used up to now ( ai=a p=1 ), introducing a higher elasticity
for price variations ( a p=1,5 ) and a lower one for variations in quality of c1  ( a1=0,1 ), the
differences between market shares becomes much smaller, and firms which were lagging behind in
the previous case are not anymore so distant from the market leaders (Graph 8). In particular
demand conditions, then, a «monopolistic» strategy of the kind depicted above can be no more
advantageous
22.
Graph 8. An example of market shares' dynamics in presence of variable mark-ups and particular conditions of final
demand* 
* High elasticity to price variations ( a p=1,5 ) and low elasticities to variations in the quality of c1  ( a1=0,1 ).
5. Competition of «deverticalized» firms
In the model we can identify three main differences between «verticalized» and «deverticalized»
firms: i) the cost structure (see above, par. 3.3); ii) the dynamics of innovation processes, on which
we will come back in the next paragraph; iii) the computation of the quality of components, which
occurs for the latter through the dynamical relationship with suppliers. In this paragraph we will
focus on the latter, with a particular regard to the following topics: i) the different possibility to
switch from one supplier to the other in different competitive conditions; ii) the different effects of
these changes in connection with a different ability of «deverticalized» firms to «read» in advance
the quality of the components supplied by intermediate firms (see the expression [7]). 
22A systematic analysis of the effects produced by different values of the parameters of final demand goes beyond the
scope of out actual interests. In the following pages we will refer always to the benchmark values which we have already
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MS_Fin_1 MS_Fin_2 MS_Fin_3 MS_Fin_4 MS_Fin_5 MS_Fin_6 MS_Fin_7 MS_Fin_8
MS_Fin_9 MS_Fin_10The opportunity for «deverticalized» firm to change their actual supplier is constrained by the
existence of other suppliers with available productive capacity in the quantity required to satisfy
their own demand (see above, par. 3.2). Graph 9 offers a clear confirmation of the relationship
between these two aspects, drawing the cumulated number of switches occurring in a simulation for
different initial productive capacities of each supplier of c1. The graph reproduces average data over
10 simulations repeated on two samples of 10 «deverticalized» firms and 10 suppliers. The meaning
of these results is clear: «deverticalized» firms can change supplier only if the initially available
productive capacity exceeds demand in a sufficient measure to ensure the permanence of a relevant
amount of unused productive capacity throughout the simulated periods. The subsequent increases
of productive capacity of suppliers occur in fact as a consequence of an adaptation to the output
growth of clients, so that the new productive capacity is immediately absorbed by the demand of the
actual clients. 
Graph 9. Relationship between  the initial productive capacity of suppliers of the component c1 and the total number of
changes of suppliers performed by «deverticalized» firms*
* Average number of cumulated switches, computed for 10 simulations repeated for each value of the initial productive capacity on a
sample of 10 «deverticalized» firms and 10 suppliers .
The positive effects induced by the possibility to change frequently suppliers are depicted in graph
10: the higher the initially available productive capacity (and consequently the fewer the limits in
the possibility to change suppliers, choosing those with the better performances), the better the
average performance of the components bought by «deverticalized» firms (see the expression [6]).
As a consequence, the competitiveness of «deverticalized» firms is strictly dependent from the
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Chg_Supplier_Cap_1 Chg_Supplier_Cap_3 Chg_Supplier_Cap_5reproduce dynamically the positive relationship between market extension and specialization, which
has been very often stressed by economic theory [Young 1928; Stigler 1951], and has gained new
attention as a consequence of the most recent trends of industrial dynamics [Langlois 2002b]. From
an evolutionary perspective the most interesting fact is that, if we want the «selective virtues» of
market to work effectively,  we must make a «wasteful» use of available resources. The selection of
best suppliers can occur only if these take the risk to anticipate potential demand, and this
possibility involves necessarily a congruence in the expectations of many actors, i. e. a condition
which is not so simple to achieve. The benefits of competition are less evident for medium values of
productive capacity (in our case equal to 3), because the probability to change is in that case lower
and the occurrence of a switch becomes more exposed to chance, as we see from the existence of
two clear «steps» in the performance curve, that coincide exactly with a change of suppliers.
Graph 10. Relationship between the initial productive capacity of suppliers and the average quality of the components*
* Average values computed for 10 simulations repeated for each value of the initial productive capacity on a sample of 10
«deverticalized» firms and 10 suppliers.
From graph 11 we can see the effect on the average quality of component c1 of the introduction of
an entry mechanism for new suppliers (see above, par. 3.5), evaluated at the same value of initial
productive capacity (set equal to 3). When the average number of new entrants per period (regulated
by the intensity  of the Poisson process) increases, the average performance of the components
improves as a consequence of the higher number of switches which are possible. This connection
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AvgX1_CAP_1 AvgX1_CAP_3 AvgX1_CAP_5of each single supplier, but rather to the total capacity available on the market
23. From a comparison
of graphs 10 and 11 we note, on the other hand, a more limited effect of a variation of   with
regard to the one produced by an increase of the initially available productive capacity. This
difference is caused by the fact that new entrants are initialized with quality values equal to the
average, and they are consequently appealing only for a part of «deverticalized» firms (namely those
resorting to suppliers with a lower quality than the average). The number of switches is thus
significantly lower than the one we could have in case the new entrants would locate themselves on
the efficiency and quality «frontier» of their sector. 
Graph 11. Connection between the average performance of components and the number of new entrants in the
intermediate sectors*
* Average values computed for 10 simulations repeated for each value of  (parameter for the intensity of a Poisson process) on a
sample of 10 «deverticalized» firms and 10 suppliers.
Finally we can examine the consequences for «deverticalized» firms of a stronger difficulty to
gather in advance a good information on the quality yielded by the suppliers. The existence of
informational distortions is formalized by the expression  [7], and regulated by the parameters
DevLearn and MaxLearn .  In the simulations  we have  presented  above we have  assumed
MaxLearn=0,9 and DevLearn=0,1 . The effect of an increase in informational distortion is
23In this regard a dynamic entry process going on throughout the simulated periods is much more effective than an
initially higher number of suppliers. In the latter case discarded suppliers soon exit from the market, reducing quickly
the supplied productive capacity at the demand level. On the contrary, a permanent flow of new firms can help supply to
exceed demand on a continuous basis, leaving more room for eventual switches in case that one of the new suppliers
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AvgX1_0.001 AvgX1_0.003 AvgX1_0.005 λ_0,01 λ_0,03 λ_0,05depicted in graph 12, in which the average quality of c1 for the above indicated values (with initial
productive capacity equal to 3 and =0,01 ) is compared to the one we get respectively for
MaxLearn=0,8 and DevLearn=0,5 ,   and   for MaxLearn=0,5 and DevLearn=1 ,   i.   e.   in
progressively worse conditions. 
Graph 12. Connection between the average quality of the components and the level of informational distortion, with
entry of new suppliers*
* Average values computed for 10 simulations repeated for each value of MaxLearn and DevLearn on a sample of 10
«deverticalized» firms and 10 suppliers, with =0,01 .
It is rather surprising that the average quality, when informational distortion increases, is firstly
higher, and then lower than the one we get from our benchmark values. This dynamics is explained
by a positive effect of a worse information on the tendency of «deverticalized» firms to change
supplier, because the former produces on the average a greater difference between the real quality of
the actual supplier and the perceived quality of the candidate supplier. This effect is stronger, given
what we have said above, when there is more productive capacity available, i. e. with a higher initial
productive capacity and/or with a higher number of new entrants. In particular, it is the entry rate of
new firms to produce the stronger effect because, while the new firms have a performance in line
with the average, the worse suppliers are continuously removed from the market. As a consequence,
the average quality of suppliers tends continuously to converge upwards, and the eventual losses
caused by a wrong decision to switch are on the average lower than the benefits of a higher number
of switches. In these conditions changing more suppliers is thus more efficient, explaining the
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AvgX1_M_0.9_D_0.1 AvgX1_M_0.8_D_0.5 AvgX1_M_0.5_D_1looking at the effects of a stronger informational distortion when the entry of new firms is not
allowed. From graph 13 it is evident that, all other things being equal, the positive effect disappears
for =0 .
Graph 13. Relationship between the average quality of the components and the informational distortion, without entry
of new suppliers*
*  Average values computed for 10 simulations repeated for each value of MaxLearn and DevLearn on a sample of 10
«deverticalized» firms and 10 suppliers, with =0 .
In conclusion, our analysis has highlighted that the competitiveness of «deverticalized» firms
increases  with a higher availability of productive capacity, be it achieved from a higher capacity of
the single suppliers or from a higher number of suppliers on the market, where the latter is best
obtained dynamically through a continuous entry of new firms. On the other hand competitiveness
decreases, even if not linearly, when client firms have a worse ability to gain correct information on
the quality of suppliers. A lower level of informational distortion can be explained by a higher
availability of communication infrastructures, thus capturing, although in a very stylized way, the
effects of a development of these infrastructures on the competitive fitness of a «deverticalized»
production pattern.
6. Innovation dynamics and competition between «verticalized» and
«deverticalized» firms
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AvgX1_M_0.9_D_0.1 AvgX1_M_0.8_D_0.5parametric values, we can focus on our main goal, namely to compare the competitive performance
of «verticalized» and «deverticalized» firms for different levels of complexity of the innovation
process. As we have specified in par. 3.4 and 3.5, the innovation process of the two typologies is
different, with a supposed inverse relationship between complexity and innovation performance of
«deverticalized» firms and their suppliers, considered as a global decentralized search architecture.
In the model the level of complexity is regulated by the parameter F rate (see expressions [23] and
[28]). Consequently our first goal is to verify the distribution of market shares between the two
typologies at different values of F rate . To complete the analysis we will then evaluate, for the
same value of F rate , the effects of the variation of some of the parameter already considered
above. 
As we had supposed presenting the model, when the levels of complexity are relatively low
( 0,3F rate0,5 ) «deverticalized» firms have a competitive advantage over «verticalized» firms,
although this advantage doesn't appear linearly. From graph 13 we see that in the initial periods of
the simulations the global market share of «deverticalized» firms is stationary if not declining, and
that the advantage achieved in intermediate periods tends subsequently to decrease in the final ones.
Even in conditions of limited complexity, the initial and final phases of the development cycle of a
product are characterized by a relative advantage for «verticalized» firms, which depends from the
logistic shape of the payoffs deriving from the innovation process (see the expression [25]). In the
first periods the positive payoffs grow slowly and thus the difference between positive and negative
payoffs is still limited, favoring the strategy of «verticalized» firms that get on the average a lower
number of negative payoffs. The advantage of «deverticalized» firms increases when the positive
payoffs grow exponentially, because at the same time the negative one increases linearly (see
expression [26]), and thus the difference between the two becomes bigger and bigger. In this
situation we observe a relative advantage of «deverticalized» firms, that accept a higher number of
innovations, because the benefits of successful innovations (i. e. those with positive payoffs) exceed
largely the damages caused by negative payoffs. 
In the final periods the advantage of «deverticalized» firms is decreasing because these, being more
efficient in their innovation process, approximate more quickly to the upper bound of the logistic
curve, leaving thus room for the «verticalized» firms to catch up. This supposition is confirmed by
the fact that the advantage of «deverticalized» firms increases for F rate=0,5 . When F rate gets
higher the share of unsuccessful innovations increases, and thus it is increased the number of
periods that are necessary for both typologies of firms to reach the upper bound of the logistic curve.
This lag enables «deverticalized» firms to exploit their advantage in the intermediate periods for a
38higher number of periods, reaching in this way a total market share which is higher than that
achieved for F rate=0,3 , and leaving for the same time period less opportunities for  l«verticalized»
firms to catch up.
Graph 13. Total market share of «deverticalized» firms for relatively low complexity levels of the innovation process*
* Average values computed for 10 simulations repeated for each value of F rate on a sample of 10 «deverticalized» firms, 10
«verticalized» firms and 10 suppliers. Competition occurs with constant mark-ups and without entry of new suppliers. Further, we
have that =0 , MaxLearn=0,9 and DevLearn=0,1 .
Now we can focus on the effects, for equal values of  complexity ( F rate=0,3 ), of the different
competitive conditions described in the previous paragraphs. Graph 14 highlights that, with respect
to the benchmark values already depicted in graph 13, only the possibility of new entrants among
suppliers produces effects on the competitiveness of «deverticalized» firms (the faster decline with
respect to benchmark values is caused by the fact that «deverticalized» firms reach even more fastly
the upper bound of the logistic curve, allowing an anticipate catch up of «verticalized» firms). If the
negative effect of a high informational distortion for «deverticalized» firms is not surprising, given
what we have already said above, the effects of the introduction of an inertial effect in competition
(due to the role of existing productive capacity) and of the possibility for final firms to change
mark-ups need to be briefly explained. As we have seen above, the first factor tends to «smooth» the
competitive dynamics, causing in this case a disadvantage for «deverticalized» firms, that have on
the average a better competitiveness. The second factor amplifies the initial differences, producing
in our case an advantage for «verticalized» firms, that have a better performance in the initial
periods. The temporary decline of market shares for «deverticalized» firms is in fact much more
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MS_Devert_F_rate_0.3 MS_Devert_F_rate_0.4 MS_Devert_F_rate_0.5Graph 14. Total market share of «deverticalized» firms, for the same complexity level of the innovation process, in
different competitive conditions*
* Average values computed for 10 simulations repeated with F rate=0,3 on a sample of 10 «verticalized» firms, 10 «deverticalized»
firms and 10 suppliers, for the following variations of the benchmark condition (graph 13): Monop= competition with variable mark-
ups; Entry= possibility for new suppliers to enter the market, with =0,03 ; Cap= competition with «inertial» effect of existing
productive   capacity,   with =0,5 ;   Dist=presence   of   a   high   information   distortion   for   «deverticalized»   firms,   with
MaxLearn=0,8 and DevLearn=0,5 .
Graph 15. Total market share of «verticalized» firms for high complexity levels  of the innovation process*
* Average values computed for 10 simulations repeated for each value of F rate on a sample of 10 «verticalized» firms, 10
«deverticalized» firms and 10 suppliers. Competition occurs with constant mark-ups and no entry of new suppliers. Further =0
, MaxLearn=0,9 and DevLearn=0,1 .
Finally, in coincidence with relatively high values of complexity ( 0,6F rate0,9 ) we have a
progressive loss of performance for «deverticalized» firms. This dynamics is indirectly depicted in
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MS_Devert_F_rate_0.3 MS_Devert_F_rate_0.3_Monop MS_Devert_F_rate_0.3_Entry
MS_Devert_F_rate_0.3_Cap MS_Devert_F_rate_0.3_Distvalues of F rate . In particular, the disadvantage of «verticalized» firms is reduced progressively
when F rate steps from a value of 0,6 to one of 0,7, and then even more steadily for F rate=0,8 .
Lastly, for F rate=0,9 we find an advantage for «verticalized» firms over the entire simulated time
period
24, showing for this value of F rate the existence of a trade-off between decentralization and
complexity, as we had supposed above. 
7. Concluding remarks
The basic idea underlying this paper is that only a complex evolutionary process can generate the
non-linear phenomena which characterize the reality of industrial dynamics, where alternative
organizational patterns exist often one beside to the other, and the metamorphosis of «dominant
forms» determines, through epidemic imitation and/or a repositioning inside «competitive niches»
which are continuously changing, dynamic paths that are difficult to predict and always open to the
emergence and disappearance of organizational and technological equilibria which are necessarily
partial. More in detail, the exploratory simulations we have presented and discussed above have
shown that our model reproduces the trade-off between decentralization and complexity, suggested
by the literature briefly exposed in par. 1, and reputed to offer a first hint for a broader explanation
of the co-evolution of organizational patterns and technology. In this direction, for example, the
model highlights a comparative advantage of «centralization», which occurs, for all levels of
complexity, in the initial and final phases of the development cycle of one product. The latter effect
is produced in the model simply by the existence of differences in the returns of innovation in
different phases of the same development cycle, which is indeed a well established stylized fact in
the studies on technological change. When the return of a successful innovation is much higher that
the damage caused by a failure, a «decentralized» search strategy yields better results even if it
implies a higher number of failures, because at the same time it guarantees also a higher number of
successes. This advantage disappears only when the probability to fail is much higher than the
probability to succeed. In our simulations the trade-off reveals itself only for very high values of
F rate , which on the other part (we must not  forget) are entirely arbitrary, because they depend on
the respective values of positive and negative payoffs, which have been fixed for our simulations in
a discretionary way. Any hypothesis on the plausibility or on the relevance in the real world of the
different parametric values examined in the paper is nonetheless beyond the scope of our actual
analysis. For the moment it is enough for us to have shown the existence of a qualitatively different
24The simulations presented in graph 15 are computed over 10.000 periods, because the time required for firms to cover
the logistic curve of the innovation process is longer for higher levels of complexity. 
41dynamics in coincidence of different levels of complexity (i. e. in different phases of product and/or
technology development), as well as the fact that this dynamics is influenced by many other
competitive factors (as for example the stronger or weaker development of intermediate sectors),
determining a wide set of structurally different dynamic patterns in coincidence of different
combinations of factors. 
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